14/09/2020 Nvidia compra ARM por 40 mil milhões

[Dark Kaeser]

Arm confirms IPO delay till later in 2023, blames global markets​

Given the state of the financial markets, it is unlikely that Arm will list in Q1 of 2023," a spokesperson told us. "However, we are well advanced in our IPO readiness process and we remain fully committed to a 2023 listing."

However, as we reported last week, SoftBank CEO and chairman Masayoshi Son claimed in the company's Q2 earnings report that he was devoting his life to growing Arm as a business over the next several years, raising the question of whether the IPO may be postponed for longer or even ditched completely.

"In the coming few years, I only like to focus on this thing. So the next explosive growth of Arm is something that I would like to concentrate on, and I devote myself into that," Son is reported as saying, in a speech that made no mention of the IPO at all.

https://www.theregister.com/2022/11/21/arm_ipo_delayed

 

[Dark Kaeser]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1638767911631478784

Resumidamente, a ARM quer cobrar o "royaltie", ou seja a percentagem, com base no preço do dispositivo e não o preço do chip em si.

 

[Nemesis11]

Quotes do artigo:

These people said Arm planned to stop charging chipmakers royalties for using its designs based on a chip’s value and instead charge device makers based on the value of the device. This should mean the company earns several times more for each design it sells, as the average smartphone is vastly more expensive than a chip.

“Arm is going to customers and saying ‘We would like to get paid more money for broadly the same thing’,” said one former senior employee who left the company last year. “What SoftBank is doing at the moment is testing the market value of the monopoly that Arm has.”

According to the new business model being presented by Arm, royalties would be set according to the average selling price (ASP) of mobile devices rather than that of the chips. The changes will mainly involve Arm’s most prominent “Cortex-A” designs, essential for the development of smartphone processors.

The average price for a smartphone computing chip is about $40 for Qualcomm, $17 for MediaTek and $6 for Unisoc.

By contrast, the average smartphone sold for $335 in 2022. While it is unlikely Arm would seek as much as 1 to 2 per cent of the value of each device, those familiar with the matter said the company would set its new pricing in a way that significantly increases overall earnings.

“The [royalty] amount will be at least several times higher than what Arm gets now,” said an executive from a leading Chinese smartphone maker which has so far refused to back the proposed plan. “We are told that they hope such changes could start from 2024.”

Some of Arm’s customers, including Apple, are both chipmakers and device makers, and have special licensing and royalty agreements with Arm. The iPhone maker is not involved in discussions about the change to Arm’s business model, said executives with knowledge of the company’s recent discussions.

https://archive.is/ao3An

Eu percebo porque é que a Softbank está a querer alterar estes acordos, antes da IPO. Querem valorizar a ARM, a curto prazo.
A médio/longo prazo, não me parece a melhor altura para esta mudança, por mais ou menos justa que seja.
Além disto, empresas que têm acordos "especiais" com a ARM, como a Apple, devem ficar com uma enorme vantagem competitiva.

Se isto for para a frente, consigo ver muitas empresas desta área a terem planos para depender menos da ARM, no espaço de 5+ anos.

 

[Metro]

A Softbank quer fazer isto porque é só negócios ruinosos atrás de negócios ruinosos e quer aqui o jackpot. Eu leio isto e só penso, RISC-V. Os fabricantes deixam de se chatear com royalties. Isto apenas iria acelerar o que a mim me parece inevitável, haver mais um player pelo menos. A quantidade de mercado que consegue depois ganhar veremos.

 

[muddymind]

A Softbank quer fazer isto porque é só negócios ruinosos atrás de negócios ruinosos e quer aqui o jackpot. Eu leio isto e só penso, RISC-V. Os fabricantes deixam de se chatear com royalties. Isto apenas iria acelerar o que a mim me parece inevitável, haver mais um player pelo menos. A quantidade de mercado que consegue depois ganhar veremos.

No entanto há um risco com RISC-V. Podes implementar extensões à tua vontade e essas podem não ser royalty free.

A Qualcomm começava logo a esfregar as mãos a implementar custom extensions e inundar o mercado mobile com isso ao ponto de se tornar "standard" e depois são todos a pagar à qualcomm. É uma ratoeira para walled garden tremenda.

Quanto à ARM simplesmente estão mesmo a dar um tiro no pé daqueles que pode mesmo ditar o seu fim a médio/longo prazo.

 

[Nemesis11]

No entanto há um risco com RISC-V. Podes implementar extensões à tua vontade e essas podem não ser royalty free.

A Qualcomm começava logo a esfregar as mãos a implementar custom extensions e inundar o mercado mobile com isso ao ponto de se tornar "standard" e depois são todos a pagar à qualcomm. É uma ratoeira para walled garden tremenda.

Não é bem assim. Para isso ter sucesso, não só têm que convencer o mercado de software a adoptar essas instruções, como essas instruções têm que ter tanto sucesso, que o software não corra sem essas instruções ou corra com uma performance muito menor.
Além disso, levantam-se mais dois problemas. Ao contrário de x86 e ARM, não há um controlo de quem pode contribuir para as especificações de Risc-V, o que faz com que qualquer outra entidade possa propor algo diferente e mesmo criando extensões custom, se quiserem que sejam integradas nas especificações oficiais de Risc-V, tem que passar por um processo de ratificação.

Isso não é uma impossibilidade de acontecer, mas não é fácil que aconteça.

 

[muddymind]

Atenção que não falei em ser ratificado para pertencer à feature set base da ISA RV mas sim continuar proprietário (tem de ser publicamente documentado devido à natureza da licença usada pelo RV mas o uso não é livre).

Eu acho que o risco para fragmentação e criação de instruções proprietárias que se podem tornar ubiquas, um risco bem real e mais provável de acontecer do que tu pensas.

 

[Roberto1973]

Arm na NVIDIA perigo para todos criadores de arm no mundo. A NVIDIA não é Softbank flexível e monopólio como é NVIDIA. A Apple vai sair arm somente risc-v continuar a apostar no futuro risc-v.

 

[Nemesis11]

Eu acho que o risco para fragmentação e criação de instruções proprietárias que se podem tornar ubiquas, um risco bem real e mais provável de acontecer do que tu pensas.

O risco de fragmentação estou de acordo. O risco de instruções proprietárias se tornarem populares, em chips vendidos no mercado, acho que é bastante baixo. Não consigo ver isso acontecer. Há demasiadas barreiras e factores que não se controlam.

Ainda relacionado com esta conversa entre ARM e Risc-V, no artigo do The Register:

We believe a good part of the momentum behind RISC-V is from Arm licensees weighing up whether it's more cost effective to create or source alternative RISC-V CPU cores than play Arm's new payment game, or at least use the nascent architecture as a bargaining tool against Arm.

Imagination Technologies – which designs and licenses families of GPUs that rival Arm's graphics cores, and has embraced RISC-V – is among those who have noticed unrest in the semiconductor world over Arm's whispered intentions.

"Arm’s behavior is unsettling their existing customer base with their customers complaining to us around their aggressive pricing," a spokesperson for Imagination told us. "We have no plans to change our business model as it’s important that chipmakers and device makers continue to have the freedom to choose their IP provider as this is key to driving innovation and technological advancement."

https://www.theregister.com/2023/03/25/arm_ipo_license/

Como é óbvio, Risc-V também pode servir apenas como arma nestas negociações.

 

[muddymind]

https://www.theregister.com/2023/04/18/arm_liable_for_softbank_loan/

Bem, isto com a ARM vai de mal a pior.

 

[Dark Kaeser]

Parece uma novela.

 

[Nemesis11]

“A springing guarantee, naming Arm as the guarantor, becomes effective on the triggering of material breach or misrepresentation, an IPO not occurring within 18 months of 31 March 2022 or such intention being announced,”

Não faço ideia o que está no contrato, mas depende também o que significa este "announced". A divulgação da intenção que a Softbank quer fazer uma IPO com a ARM, já foi feita há muito, mas é provável que o significado seja o registo formal.

The accounts reveal that another subsidiary of Arm parent SoftBank entered into an agreement with financial intuitions in March 2022 to borrow $8 billion, providing 75.01 percent of Arm's shares as collateral.

The value of Arm at the public offer is estimated to be anything from $30-60 billion.

Uma garantia de 75% de uma empresa avaliada entre 30 a 60 mil milhões, não relacionada com o pagamento de um empréstimo que só tem o valor total de 8 mil milhões......yakes!!!!

 

[Roberto1973]

Arm na NVIDIA vai dar muitos problemas. Un deles é fim do arm LIVRE e terem controle sobre tudo resto ondé arm chega e sim o seus futurologia.

 

[muddymind]

Rapaz, o deal com a nvidia há muito que foi à vida. Apenas estamos a reaproveitar a thread para centralizar informações acerca do desaire que está a ser a gestão da ARM.

 

[Nemesis11]

Esta noticia do FT é intrigante, porque não sei se terá algum alcance futuro ou se é sequer relevante, visto que não é a primeira vez que a ARM produz Chips de teste. No entanto, parece haver algum receio, por parte dos parceiros, que isto seja uma indicação de alteração de rumo, por parte da ARM.

Chip designer Arm makes its own advanced prototype semiconductor​

Company to build test chip with factory partners, stoking fears it could in future compete with its biggest customers

Arm is developing its own chip to showcase the capabilities of its designs, as the SoftBank-owned group seeks to attract new customers and fuel growth following a blockbuster IPO later this year.
The company will team up with manufacturing partners to develop the new chip, according to people briefed on the move who describe it as the most advanced chipmaking effort the Cambridge-headquartered group has ever embarked upon.

The hope is that the prototype will allow it to demonstrate the power and capabilities of its designs to the wider market.

Arm has previously built some test chips with partners including Samsung and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co, largely aimed at enabling software developers to gain familiarity with new products.
However, multiple industry executives told the FT that its newest chip — on which it started work in the past six months — is “more advanced” than ever before. Arm has also formed a bigger team that will execute the effort and is targeting the product at chip manufacturers more than software developers, they said.
The company has built a new “solutions engineering” team that will lead the development of these prototype chips for mobile devices, laptops and other electronics, according to people briefed on the move.

Rumblings about Arm’s chipmaking moves have stoked fears in the semiconductor industry that if it makes a good enough chip, it could seek to sell it in the future and thereby become a competitor to some of its biggest customers, such as MediaTek or Qualcomm.

People close to Arm insist there are no plans to sell or license the product and that it is only working on a prototype. Arm declined to comment.

https://archive.is/Yimm6

Algumas coisas nesta noticia que me fazem confusão. O chip parece que é para ser mostrado antes da IPO e só começaram a trabalhar nele há 6 meses? Uma divisão completamente nova só para protótipos de soluções, que chamam de "most advanced chipmaking effort the Cambridge-headquartered group has ever embarked upon", sem qualquer intenção de os comercializar a OEMs?

 

[Dark Kaeser]

Também não percebo, a ARM não fez sempre "prototipagem" de chips e SoC?

Aliás tanto quanto sei basta ir ao site da ARM pedir (e pagar) uma licença de um SoC com determinadas características (cpu + GPU etc) e pronto a produzir em algumas Foundries/processos à escolha.

Aliás ainda há dias a ARM anunciou que a Intel IFS (parte da estratégia IDM 2.0 Foundry) passa a ser uma das opções nos 18A (18 Angstrom).

https://www.intel.com/content/www/u...on-collaboration-leading-edge-soc-design.html

 

[Nemesis11]

Intel in talks to be anchor investor in Arm IPO - source​

June 12 (Reuters) - Intel (INTC.O) is in talks with SoftBank Group Corp's (9984.T) Arm to be an anchor investor in the chip designer's initial public offering (IPO), a source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Monday.

Arm plans to sell its shares on Nasdaq later this year, seeking to raise $8-$10 billion, Reuters reported earlier in April.

Arm's designs are used to manufacture chips made by most of the world's major semiconductor companies, including Intel, AMD (AMD.O), Nvidia (NVDA.O) and Qualcomm (QCOM.O). It was not immediately clear what impact any IPO investment by one or more of those companies would have on Arm's commercial relationships.

The chip designer had filed with regulators confidentially for a U.S. stock market listing in April, setting the stage for this year's largest IPO.

Arm and Intel declined a Reuters request for comment.

https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/intel-talks-be-anchor-investor-arm-ipo-source-2023-06-13/

Poucos detalhes, mas aqui fica.

 

[Dark Kaeser]

A Softbank pelos vistos vai avançar para o IPO.

https://www.wsj.com/business/telecom/circuit-designer-arm-files-for-ipo-83c9a584

 

[Dark Kaeser]

Proveniente da submissão do formulário à SEC, estive a dar uma leitura, a confusão da ARM China é capaz de durar mais mesmo tempo que as temporadas de "Dallas", e bastante clarificada agora, devido ao IPO

Prior to this offering, there has been no public market for the ADSs orour ordinary shares. The initial public offering price per ADS is estimated to be between $47.00 and $51.00. We have applied to list our ADSs on the Nasdaq Global Select Market (“Nasdaq”) under the symbol “ARM”.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Apple Inc., Cadence Design Systems, Inc., Google International LLC, Intel Corporation, MediaTek Inc.’saffiliated entities, NVIDIA Corporation, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Synopsys, Inc. and TSMC Partners, Ltd. (collectively, the “Cornerstone Investors”) have, severally and not jointly, indicated an interest in purchasing up toan aggregate of $735 million of the ADSs offered in this offering at the initial public offering price and on the same terms and conditions as the other purchasers in this offering. Because these indications of interest are not bindingagreements or commitments to purchase, any of the Cornerstone Investors may determine to purchase more, fewer, or no ADSs in this offering, or the underwriters may determine to sell more, fewer, or no ADSs to any of the Cornerstone Investors. Theunderwriters will receive the same underwriting discount on any ADSs purchased by the Cornerstone Investors as they will from the other ADSs sold to the public in this offering.

Risks Relating to Our Business and Industry

• Our concentration of revenue from the PRC market makes us particularly susceptible to economic and politicalrisks affecting the PRC, which could be exacerbated by tensions between (on the one hand) the U.S. or the U.K. and (on the other hand) the PRC with respect to trade and national security.
• 
  
• Developing new products requires us to expend significant resources without assurances that we will generate revenue in the amounts we anticipate, on the expected timeline or at all.
• 
  
• We depend on our commercial relationship with Arm China to access the PRC market. If that commercial relationshipno longer existed or deteriorates, our ability to compete in the PRC market could be materially and adversely affected.
• 
  
• Neither we nor SoftBank Group control the operations of Arm China, which operates independently of us.

We face intense competition and could lose market share to our competitors.

We anticipate continued challenges from current and new competitors, including established technologies such as the x86 architecture, as well as by free,open-source technologies, including the RISC-V architecture. Many of our customers are also major supporters of the RISC-V architecture and related technologies. If RISC-V-related technology continues to be developed and market support for RISC-V increases, our customers may choose to utilize this free, open-source architecture instead ofour products. Additionally, many of our direct and indirect competitors, including some of our semiconductor customers, are major corporations with substantially greater technical, financial and marketing resources and name recognition than we have.Some of these competitors have a much larger application software base and a much larger installed customer base than we do, and there can be no assurance that we will have the financial resources, technical expertise, and marketing, distributionand support capabilities to compete successfully with them in the future.

For example, in August 2023, a group of our customers and other competitors announced a joint venture aimed at accelerating the adoption of RISC-V. Although the development of alternative architectures and technology is a time-intensive process, if ourcompetitors establish cooperative relationships or consolidate with each other or third parties, such as the recently announced joint venture focused on RISC-V, they may have additional resources that would allow them to more quickly developarchitectures and other technology that directly compete with our products. Such cooperative relationships or consolidations may also allow competitors to anticipate or respond more quickly and effectively than we can to new or changingopportunities, technologies, standards or customer requirements. If we are unable to anticipate or react to these competitive challenges, our competitive position could weaken and we could experience a decline in revenue and profitability.

Our results of operations, particularlyour licensing and royalty revenues, can vary significantly between periods and may be unpredictable.

• the financial results of Arm China and its ability to make payments to us in a timely manner, or at all;

A significant portion of our total revenue comes from a limited number of customers, which exposesus to greater risks than if our customer base were more diversified.

A significant portion of our total revenue is generated froma limited number of key customers. In particular, our top five customers (including Arm China) collectively accounted for approximately 57% and 56% of our total revenue for the fiscal years ended March 31, 2023 and 2022, respectively, and ourlargest customer individually, Arm China, accounted for approximately 24% and 18% of our total revenue, respectively, during those fiscal years.

Our concentration of revenue from the PRC market makes us particularly susceptible toeconomic and political risks affecting the PRC, which could be exacerbated by tensions between (on the one hand) the U.S. or the U.K. and (on the other hand) the PRC with respect to trade and national security.

For the fiscal years ended March 31, 2023, 2022 and 2021, revenues from the PRC accounted for approximately 25%, 18% and 20% of our totalrevenue, respectively, including both direct revenues and revenues derived from our relationship with Arm China. Our revenues in the PRC are derived from PRC semiconductor companies and OEMs, and from non-PRCsemiconductor companies and OEMs that utilize our products in chips and end products they sell into the PRC, which, by country, has the largest number of smartphone users in the world.

Political actions, includingtrade and national security policies of the U.S. and PRC governments, such as tariffs, placing companies on restricted lists, export controls or new end-use controls, have in the past, currently do and could in the future limit or prevent us,directly or through our commercial relationship with Arm China, from transacting business with certain PRC customers or suppliers, limit, prevent or discourage certain PRC customers or suppliers from transacting business with us or Arm China, ormake it more expensive to do so, which could adversely affect demand for our products. Given our revenue concentration in the PRC, if, due to actual, threatened or potential U.S., U.K. or PRC government actions or policies: Arm China is furtherlimited in, or prohibited from, licensing our products to PRC semiconductor companies and OEMs; our non-PRC semiconductor companies and OEM customers were limited in, or prohibited from, selling devices intothe PRC that incorporate our products; PRC semiconductor companies and OEMs develop and use their own technology or use our competitors’ technology in some or all of their devices; or our PRC customers delay or cease making payments of licensefees owed, our business, revenues, results of operations, cash flows and financial condition could be materially harmed.

We depend on our commercial relationship with Arm China to access the PRC market. If that commercial relationship no longer existed or deteriorates, ourability to compete in the PRC market could be materially and adversely affected.

Substantially all of our PRC-related revenue is earned through the IPLA, pursuant to which, among other things, we granted Arm China certain exclusive rights to sublicense our IP to PRC customers. We expect that our licensing relationshipwith Arm China will continue to account for substantially all of our total revenues from the PRC and represent a significant portion of our revenues for the foreseeable future. It would be difficult for us to replace any lost PRC-sourced revenue in the event that our commercial relationship with Arm China were to terminate or deteriorate. Accordingly, we expect that Arm China will continue to provide our primary access to the PRC marketfor the foreseeable future. If we fail to maintain our commercial relationship with Arm China, our access to the PRC market could be materially diminished and our business, results of operations, financial condition and prospects for growth could bematerially and adversely affected.

Neither we nor SoftBank Group control the operations of Arm China, which operates independently of us.

Despite our significant reliance on Arm China through our commercial relationship with them, both as a source of revenue and as aconduit to the important PRC market, Arm China operates independently of us. On March 28, 2022, we transferred our entire equity interest in Arm China to a subsidiary of SoftBank Group. As of the date of this prospectus, approximately 48% ofthe equity interest in Arm China is owned by Acetone Limited, which is controlled by SoftBank Group and in which we own a 10% non-voting interest, approximately 35% is indirectly owned by HOPU Investment Management Company, and approximately 17% isdirectly and indirectly owned by other Chinese parties. Our 10% non-voting interest in Acetone Limited represents an approximate 4.8% indirect ownership interest in Arm China.

Furthermore, we do not have any direct management rights with respect to Arm China, such as a right to representation on Arm China’sboard of directors, although Mr. Haas continues to serve on the board as an appointee of the SoftBank Group affiliate holding Arm’s former equity interest in Arm China. Following the transfer of our interest in Arm China to a subsidiary ofSoftBank Group, under the terms of the Arm China arrangement, the SoftBank Group affiliate holding Arm’s former equity interest in Arm China is entitled to appoint a minority of the directors of the board of Arm China, and SoftBank Group’sappointees are unable to unilaterally implement certain measures that require action by all of or a supermajority of the directors of Arm China.

The fact that Arm China operates independently of us exposes us to significant risks. ArmChina’s value to us as a customer is dependent on Arm China’s business results, which are, in turn, subject to substantial risks that are outside of our control. For example, Arm China may not commit the necessary resources to market andsell our products to PRC end-users of our semiconductor IP products. Arm China also may fail to comply with the laws and regulatory requirements applicable to its business, which could limit its ability to market or sell our products in the PRC. Inaddition, Arm China may fail to attract, train, retain and motivate highly skilled managerial and technical personnel necessary for its business. Arm China may also have difficulties accessing funding or enforcing contractual relationships. Therealization of these or other risks related to Arm China’s business may have a material adverse effect on Arm China’s business, results of operations, financial condition and prospects and, by extension, our own. Since Arm China operatesindependently of us and we do not control Arm China, our ability to take measures to address the various risks facing Arm China is limited. If any of such risks related to Arm China’s business are realized, our revenue could materially declineand our results of operations could be materially adversely affected.

Under the IPLA with Arm China, Arm China’s payments due to usare determined based on the financial information that Arm China provides to us. Accordingly, similar to our other royalty customers, we are dependent on Arm China providing us with reliable and timely information. We perform various procedures toassess the reasonableness of Arm China’s data, and the IPLA includes rights for us to audit Arm China’s activities to ensure compliance with the IPLA. In the past, we have had issues obtaining timely and accurate information from ArmChina.

Additionally, since April 2022, Allen Wu, the former chief executive officer of Arm China, and certain entities under his effective control,have initiated several lawsuits in the courts of the PRC seeking to challenge certain aspects of Arm China’s corporate governance and the actions of Arm China’s board of directors. To date, all cases that have been resolved at the trialcourt level have been resolved favorably to Arm China but are subject to appeal. In the event that certain of these cases were to be decided adversely to Arm China, it could result in further changes to Arm China’s corporate governance andmanagement structure, which could reduce SoftBank Group’s ability to conduct effective oversight of Arm China and result in a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition and prospects.

We may face increasing competition with PRC companies that develop their own IP.

With respect to Arm China, although the terms of the IPLA with Arm China prohibit Arm China from developing microprocessor cores and onlyallow Arm China to develop derivative products using Arm IP with our consent, Arm China may independently develop competitive products other than microprocessor cores and could divert customer interest from our products to increase its market shareto our detriment. The realization of any such risks could materially harm our business, results of operations, cash flows and financial condition.

We are currently involved in pending litigation.

We areinvolved in pending litigation, including, but not limited to, a lawsuit with Qualcomm Inc. and Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. (together “Qualcomm”) and Nuvia, Inc. (“Nuvia”). In addition, our products are involved in pendinglitigation to which we are not a party. We cannot provide you any assurances regarding how any such litigation will be resolved, what benefits we will obtain or what losses we might incur.

On August 31, 2022, we sued Qualcomm and Nuvia in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, on the basis that Qualcomm andNuvia: (i) breached the termination provisions of Nuvia’s Architecture License Agreement (the “Nuvia ALA”) with us by failing to destroy technology Nuvia developed under the Nuvia ALA, which we terminated in March 2022 based onNuvia’s failure to obtain our consent to the assignment of the Nuvia ALA to Qualcomm; and (ii) will infringe our trademarks when Qualcomm uses them in connection with the Nuvia technology subject to destruction under the Nuvia ALA.

SoftBank Group’s interests may conflict with our own interests and those of holders of our ADSs.

The interests of SoftBank Group may not coincide with our own interests or the interests of holders of our ADSs. Because SoftBankGroup will generally have the ability, subject to limitations in the Articles and the Companies Act, to control all matters submitted to our shareholders for approval, including the election of all of the members of our Board of Directors, and willhave certain enhanced rights pursuant to the Shareholder Governance Agreement, other shareholders will have limited ability to influence corporate matters. As a result, SoftBank Group may cause us to take corporate actions, including engaging intransactions with SoftBank Group or affiliates of SoftBank Group, that members of our management or other shareholders do not view as beneficial, or that provide SoftBank Group with benefits at our expense. Such actions could have a material andadverse effect on our business, results of operations and the trading price of our ADSs.

Disputes may arise between us and SoftBank Group or its affiliates in a number of areas,including relating to arrangements with third parties that are exclusionary to us or SoftBank Group or its affiliates and business opportunities that may be attractive to both us and SoftBank Group or its affiliates. Furthermore, disputes may arisebetween us and SoftBank Group or its affiliates with respect to Arm China. As of the date hereof, approximately 48% of the equity interest in Arm China is owned by Acetone Limited, which SoftBank Group controls and in which we own a 10% non-voting interest (representing an approximate 4.8% indirect interest). We may not be able to resolve any potential conflicts with SoftBank Group and, even if we do, the resolution may be less favorable than if wewere dealing with an unaffiliated party, which could have an adverse effect on our business, results of operations and the trading price of our ADSs. In addition, any disputes between us and SoftBank Group could distract our management.

https://forum.zwame.pt/threads/14-09-2020-nvidia-compra-arm-por-40-mil-milhoes.965026/page-10

deve haver mais alguma coisa, mas desisti algures na página 135

 

[Nemesis11]

Proveniente da submissão do formulário à SEC, estive a dar uma leitura, a confusão da ARM China é capaz de durar mais mesmo tempo que as temporadas de "Dallas", e bastante clarificada agora, devido ao IPO

Conclusão, o problema da ARM China não ficou resolvido antes da IPO e a novela vai continuar, sem que os investidores na IPO saibam como vai acabar.

the fiscal years ended March 31, 2023 and 2022, respectively, and ourlargest customer individually, Arm China, accounted for approximately 24% and 18% of our total revenue, respectively, during those fiscal years

the financial results of Arm China and its ability to make payments to us in a timely manner, or at all

Ter este risco pendente sobre 1/4 do revenue no ultimo ano, é mesmo muito preocupante. Nem sei se a IPO deveria ter ido para a frente.

SoftBank’s $50bn Arm IPO more than five times oversubscribed, bankers say​

Aparentemente, boas notícias, mas........

95.5 million American depository shares of the United Kingdom-based company for $47 to $51 apiece

Isto representa apenas 10% da ARM.

Limiting the initial listing to the sale of a small stake is not uncommon in tech IPOs. But analysts say SoftBank’s plan to hold on to most of its shares in Arm and use them to borrow money could restrict the supply over the longer term to increase its value.

As well as retaining more than 90 per cent of a company that Son believes will underpin the future of computing, SoftBank will also be able to lean on the newly listed company as a major source of financing.

O resto da empresa servirá como moeda de troca para a Softbank pedir empréstimos no mercado. Quanto mais valiosa a ARM for, melhor.

advisers working on the Nasdaq listing said there was “little price sensitivity among investors”, many of whom would be forced to buy because of Arm’s inclusion in indices.

Algumas das subscrições não são pela empresa em si.

Arm executives projected revenue growth would accelerate after a flat year in 2023, as it increased the royalties it is paid by smartphone makers, said people who attended the roadshow. Arm indicated it could achieve revenue growth of at least 20 per cent in the financial year ending March 2025, ahead of analysts’

Dá ideia que aumentaram os royalties, para melhorar as contas a curto prazo. Claro que um aumento de royalties pode ter consequências negativas a longo prazo.

Brokers from the 28-strong army of banks selling Arm’s IPO gathered more than 100 of the world’s biggest fund managers at a New York hotel this week to convince them that this was their chance to be big winners in AI.

However, some fund managers on the receiving end of the Arm charm offensive said the sheer number of bankers involved in the IPO was itself a red flag.

“The fact that everyone is coming to us with their Arm pitch feels like something that happens at the end of a cycle when it is difficult to sell a story,” said an asset manager at one global technology fund. “It’s not good optics if this is supposed to be the start of the AI cycle.”

Têm um exercito a vender a IPO.

Then last month, in a surprise deal, SoftBank bought a 25 per cent stake in Arm from its own Vision Fund in a transaction which valued Arm at $64bn.

Isto é uma compra dentro do grupo. É dinheiro que passa de um bolso para o outro, mas olhando para o valor, coloca o valor da ARM nos 64 mil milhões de $.

Source - https://archive.ph/S32pU

Dá mesmo ideia que a Softbank está a "puxar" ao máximo por um valor total da ARM o maior possível, sem olhar muito a possíveis más consequências no futuro.